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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1918 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CEDRIC BROWN 
a/k/a BLEED 
                         
CEDRIC BROWN, 
                      Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. No.3-08-cr-00445) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2011 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 24, 2011) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 
 Cedric Brown (“Brown” or “Appellant”) pled guilty to possessing with intent to 
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distribute and distributing heroin and crack cocaine.  The District Court sentenced him to 
151 months of imprisonment.  Brown now seeks review of this sentence, arguing that the 
District Court committed a procedural error in imposing this sentence.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm the sentence.  
I.  Background Facts 
 We write primarily for the parties, and thus recount only the essential facts. 
 At Brown‟s sentencing, the District Court calculated his total offense level to be 
30, but that level was increased to 32, due to Brown‟s status as a career offender.  Based 
on Brown‟s acceptance of responsibility for his actions, the total offense level was 
reduced to 29.  Brown‟s criminal history category was VI, resulting in a Guidelines range 
of 151 to 188 months of imprisonment.  Arguing that Brown‟s co-defendants had 
received lesser sentences and that Brown‟s role in the drug distribution ring was limited, 
Brown‟s counsel urged the District Court to apply the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) in order to overlook the impact of Brown‟s career offender status, and impose a 
sentence below the Guidelines range.    
 Before imposing sentence, the District Court considered Brown‟s numerous prior 
convictions for dealing drugs, his personal history, the need for deterrence (both for 
Brown and others in society), the need to provide substantial punishment, and the need to 
provide some benefit to Brown in the form of educational and vocational opportunities.  
Taking all of these factors into account, the District Court imposed a sentence at the 
bottom of the Guidelines range.  
3 
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “[P]ost- Booker, „the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies 
to appellate review of sentencing decisions.‟”  U.S. v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007)).  That is, “appellate review of 
sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are „reasonable.‟”  Gall, 552 
U.S. at 46. 
III.  Legal Standard 
 When imposing sentence, district courts must follow a three-step process: 
(1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant‟s Guidelines sentence 
precisely as they would have before Booker.  
 
(2) In doing so, they must “formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties 
and stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into account [our] 
Circuit‟s pre- Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.”  
 
(3) Finally, they are required to “exercise[ ] [their] discretion by 
considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors,” in setting the sentence they 
impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the 
Guidelines. 
 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. King, 
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 454 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2006)) (internal citations omitted).
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 “[A]ppellate review proceeds in two stages.  It begins by „ensur[ing] that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or 
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous 
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for 
any deviation from the Guidelines range.‟”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (quoting Gall, 552 
U.S. at 51).  “If a district court‟s procedure passes muster, „we then, at stage two, 
consider its substantive reasonableness.‟”  Id. (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 
F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
IV.  Analysis 
 Brown “contends that the District Court failed to adequately apply the relevant 
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the facts and circumstances of this case.”  
(Br. for Appellant Cedric Brown 10.)  Specifically, Brown argues that the District Court 
failed to give proper consideration to “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 
kinds of sentences available, and, most importantly, the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.”  (Id. at 11.)  Additionally, Brown argues that the District Court 
                                                 
1
  “As an aside, our Court has previously stated that we distinguish between 
traditional departures based on a specific Guidelines provision and sentencing „variances‟ 
from the Guidelines that are based on Booker and the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors.”  
Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247 n.10 (citing United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 195 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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erred by placing “undue emphasis” on his prior drug convictions which resulted in 
Brown‟s classification as a career offender.  (Id. at 11-12.) 
 Reviewing the sentencing transcript, we conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of 151 months.  At the sentencing hearing, 
Brown‟s counsel argued that the District Court should not impose a sentence that is 
“greater than necessary” and should consider the sentence disparities between Brown and 
his co-defendants based on the relative drug amounts to which each defendant pled, as 
well as the respective roles they played.  (App. 58-59.)  The District Court asked counsel 
about the impact of Brown‟s career offender status.  While acknowledging that the career 
offender status was a “problem,” counsel emphasized that imposing a sentence that took 
Brown‟s career offender status into account “just does not seem fair.”  (Id. at 61.) 
 After hearing argument from Brown‟s counsel and the government, the District 
Court noted that, after presiding over all of the co-defendants‟ cases, it was “familiar with 
the various roles that people played in this drug distribution conspiracy.”  (Id. at 65.)  The 
District Court recognized that although Brown was not the leader of the conspiracy, and 
that the drug amount for which Brown was responsible was less than one of the other 
defendants, he was an integral part of the conspiracy.   Further, the District Court 
recognized that it had to consider the fact that Brown‟s multiple drug convictions 
required that he be sentenced as a career offender, which more than justified a Guidelines 
sentence.  The District Court noted that Brown‟s counsel offered a reasonable argument, 
but emphasized that it “cannot justify sentencing lower than the guidelines range as a 
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function of [Brown‟s] past criminal record.”  (Id. at 66.)  
V.  Conclusion 
 In light of the District Court‟s reasoned analysis and thorough discussion of many 
of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Brown to 151 months.  The sentence is procedurally sound and substantively 
reasonable.  We will affirm the District Court‟s sentence. 
